Harden RateLimit against X-Forwarded-For spoofing
Key on RemoteAddr by default; honor X-Forwarded-For only when the peer is a configured trusted proxy (WithTrustedProxies), walking right-to-left to the first untrusted hop. This closes a trivial rate-limit bypass and the matching unbounded-bucket DoS via spoofed headers. Add WithMaxKeys with opportunistic eviction of idle (fully-refilled) buckets to bound memory. Drop the hand-rolled indexOf in favor of stdlib.
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@@ -83,28 +83,59 @@ func TestRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
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}
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})
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t.Run("uses X-Forwarded-For", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Run("ignores X-Forwarded-For without trusted proxies", func(t *testing.T) {
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// By default the limiter keys on RemoteAddr only. A spoofed,
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// per-request X-Forwarded-For must not let a single peer bypass the
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// limit by minting a fresh bucket each time.
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mw := server.RateLimit(
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server.WithRate(1),
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server.WithBurst(1),
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)(okHandler)
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// Exhaust limit for 10.0.0.1.
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.1, 192.168.1.1")
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req.RemoteAddr = "192.168.1.1:1234"
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mw.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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send := func(xff string) int {
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", xff)
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req.RemoteAddr = "192.168.1.1:1234"
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mw.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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return w.Code
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}
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// Same forwarded IP should be rate limited.
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w = httptest.NewRecorder()
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req = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.1, 192.168.1.1")
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req.RemoteAddr = "192.168.1.1:1234"
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mw.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if code := send("10.0.0.1"); code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("first request: got %d, want %d", code, http.StatusOK)
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}
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// Different spoofed XFF, same peer — must still be limited.
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if code := send("10.0.0.2"); code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
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t.Fatalf("spoofed XFF bypassed limit: got %d, want %d", code, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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}
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})
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if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
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t.Fatalf("got status %d, want %d", w.Code, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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t.Run("honors X-Forwarded-For behind trusted proxy", func(t *testing.T) {
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mw := server.RateLimit(
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server.WithRate(1),
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server.WithBurst(1),
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server.WithTrustedProxies("192.168.0.0/16"),
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)(okHandler)
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send := func(xff string) int {
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", xff)
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req.RemoteAddr = "192.168.1.1:1234" // trusted proxy
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mw.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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return w.Code
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}
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// Real client 10.0.0.1 (left-most), proxy hop 192.168.1.1 (right-most).
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if code := send("10.0.0.1, 192.168.1.1"); code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("first request: got %d, want %d", code, http.StatusOK)
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}
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if code := send("10.0.0.1, 192.168.1.1"); code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
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t.Fatalf("same client not limited: got %d, want %d", code, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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}
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// A different real client through the same proxy is independent.
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if code := send("10.0.0.2, 192.168.1.1"); code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("different client should be allowed: got %d, want %d", code, http.StatusOK)
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}
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})
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