Files
MultiforaDB/tests/fuzz
Aleksey Shakhmatov 6c7f1f2e77 tests/fuzz: crash-consistency fuzzer (crash-fuzz.js + README)
Black-box SIGKILL fuzzer for the M0 mmap+WAL crash story. Random write
workload through the official driver, kill -9 at a random point, reopen the
same log, verify the recovered state against an in-memory model:

- prefix invariant: recovered state == history[0..m) for some m in
  [acked, sent]; every acked write durable, in-flight commands all-or-nothing
  (group commit), nothing after them may survive
- always-opens (replay never refuses); index presence tied to the prefix and
  find({k:v}) correctness (rebuild after replay); countDocuments
- unexpected server death (Zig panic, replay refusal) is a finding with the
  server log; --verify-exec read-backs updates to separate execution bugs
  from replay bugs; --no-kill for graceful-restart runs; --heavy passes a
  1 MiB compact threshold to fuzz compaction/checkpoint windows

Deterministic via seeded PRNG; failures dump a repro artifact with the seed.
Mutation-checked: over-strict prefix check goes red on lost in-flight ops.

Observation recorded: small churn-heavy DBs can exhaust the pager's 64 GB
address-space reservation (data file grows in >=8 MiB compounding steps and
never shrinks without a rebuild), surfacing as DatabaseTooLarge on writes.
2026-08-04 00:05:09 +03:00
..

Fuzz / torture harnesses

Black-box and in-process harnesses that hunt for engine bugs and bottlenecks that the fixed e2e scenarios cannot reach. The e2e suites prove specific behaviours; these generate their own workloads and check invariants.

crash-fuzz.js — crash-consistency fuzzer

The P0 harness for the M0 (mmap + WAL) crash story. Drives the server through the official driver with a random write workload (insert batches, single inserts, $set/$inc/$unset updates, deletes, createIndex), kills it with SIGKILL at a random point, reopens the same log file, and verifies the recovered state against an in-memory model.

The invariant under test (the "prefix invariant"). With one sequential client and fsync-before-ack commits, the state that survives a crash must be apply(history[0..m)) for some m with acked <= m <= sent: every fully-acked write is durable, an in-flight command is either fully there or fully gone (group commit = one fsync per command), and nothing after it may survive. The verifier also checks, at the matched prefix:

  • the database always opens (replay never refuses — PLAN ground rule 4);
  • the k_1 index exists iff its create record is in the prefix, and find({k: v}) returns exactly the docs with k == v (index rebuild after replay must be correct, whether the query used the index or a scan);
  • countDocuments({}) matches the model.

Cycles share one log file, so checkpoints, log truncation, COW free-list reuse and compaction (in --heavy) are exercised across cycles. The server spawned by the harness may never self-crash: a Zig panic or a replay refusal is reported as a finding with the server log.

Usage

zig build                                   # fresh server binary first!
node tests/fuzz/crash-fuzz.js               # 60 quick cycles, random seed
node tests/fuzz/crash-fuzz.js --seed 42     # reproducible scenario
node tests/fuzz/crash-fuzz.js --heavy       # big batches + 1 MB compact
                                            # threshold: hits checkpoint/
                                            # compaction windows
node tests/fuzz/crash-fuzz.js --no-kill --verify-exec
                                            # graceful stop + reopen, and
                                            # read-back every update (isolates
                                            # execution bugs from replay bugs)

Options: --seed N --rounds N --max-docs N --batch-max N --kill-delay-ms N --verbose --keep-log --port N. On failure a repro artifact is written to /tmp/crash-fuzz-fail-<seed>.json and the rerun command is printed.

Determinism: the op sequence and the kill decision come from a seeded PRNG, so the same seed reproduces the same scenario. Kill timing inside the window is OS-scheduled (as in any crash tester — RocksDB db_crashtest works the same way); a failure's seed + artifact reproduce the scenario, and the invariant check is timing-independent.

Mutation-checked (repo ground rule 2): making the verifier require m == sent (over-strict) turns seeds with lost in-flight ops red, proving the harness actually observes both prefix states (acked and sent), not just the full state.

Notes on what the crash fuzzer does not cover (by design)

  • Torn log tails / torn watermark writes: kill -9 is process death, not power loss — page cache survives, so a partially-written block is rare and OS-scheduled. The replay fuzzer (log truncation at random offsets) is the deterministic way to hit that surface; it is planned (P0 item 2) but not yet built.
  • Concurrent clients: the fuzzer uses one sequential client so the prefix invariant is exactly checkable. Race/interleaving coverage stays with tests/e2e/e2e2.js concurrent.
  • Semantic differential vs real MongoDB: planned (P1 item 4).

Known engine observations (findings so far)

  • A small churn-heavy database can exhaust the pager's 64 GB address-space reservation: the data file grows in ≥8 MiB steps, compounding, and never shrinks until a compaction (data-file rebuild) or checkpoint reclaims it. With --compact-threshold left at the 16 MB default and a small log, the file can reach 64 GB and writes start failing with DatabaseTooLarge after enough growth events. --heavy passes --compact-threshold 1 MiB to keep the file bounded and to fuzz the rebuild+crash path.